



Micro

ECON

McFachern

2010-2011

CHAPTER
19

*International
Trade*

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The Gains from Trade


- Law of comparative advantage
- Countries specialize
 - Goods with the lowest opportunity cost
- U.S. exports
 - \$1.6 trillion (12% of GDP) in 2007
 - Services (30.2%)
- U.S. imports
 - \$2.3 trillion (17% of GDP) in 2007
 - Industrial supply (27.1%)




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Composition of U.S. Exports and Imports in 2007

(a) U.S. Exports



(b) U.S. Imports



Production Possibilities Without Trade

- Production possibilities
 - With existing resources
- No trade
 - Production possibilities = consumption possibilities
- Production possibilities frontier



Production Possibilities Schedules for United States and Izodia


Exhibit 2

<i>(a) United States</i>						
Production Possibilities with 100 Million Workers (millions of units per day)						
	<i>U₁</i>	<i>U₂</i>	<i>U₃</i>	<i>U₄</i>	<i>U₅</i>	<i>U₆</i>
Food	600	480	360	240	120	0
Clothing	0	60	120	180	240	300


<i>(b) Izodia</i>						
Production Possibilities with 200 Million Workers (millions of units per day)						
	<i>I₁</i>	<i>I₂</i>	<i>I₃</i>	<i>I₄</i>	<i>I₅</i>	<i>I₆</i>
Food	200	160	120	80	40	0
Clothing	0	80	160	240	320	400

Exhibit 3

Production Possibilities Frontiers for the United States and Izodia Without Trade (millions of units per day)



Slope: opportunity cost of an additional unit of food is $\frac{1}{2}$ unit of clothing



An additional unit of food costs 2 units of clothing.

Food is produced at a lower opportunity cost in the United States.



Consumption Possibilities

- **Gains from specialization and trade**
 - **Each country should specialize**
 - **Producing the good with the lower opportunity cost**
- **Terms of trade**
- **Consumption possibilities frontier**
 - **Possible combinations of good**
 - **As result of specialization and exchange**
- **Depend on relative preferences**



Exhibit 4

Production (and Consumption) Possibility Frontiers with Trade (millions of units per day)




Trade: 1 unit of clothing for 1 unit of food. Both countries are better off as a result of international trade.

Reasons for International Specialization

- **Differences in resource endowments**
 - **Create differences in opportunity cost**
 - **Countries export**
 - **Produce more cheaply**
 - **Countries import**
 - **Products unavailable domestically**
 - **Cheaper elsewhere**



U.S. Production as a Percentage of U.S. Consumption for Various Commodities



If U.S. production is <100% of consumption, imports make up the difference.
If U.S. production exceeds U.S. consumption, then the difference is exported.

Reasons for International Specialization

- Economies of scale
 - Firms produce more
 - Reducing average costs
- Differences in tastes



OR



?



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

Consumer and Producer Surplus

- **Market exchange**
 - **Demand: marginal benefit**
 - **Consumer surplus**
 - **Difference between what consumers would pay and what they do pay**
 - **Supply: marginal cost**
 - **Producer surplus**
 - **Difference between actual amount received and what they would accept**



Consumer and Producer Surplus from Market Exchange

Exhibit 6



- **Tariff: Tax on imports**
 - **Specific**
 - \$ amount per unit
 - **Ad valorem**
 - Percentage per unit
 - **Effects**
 - Loss of consumer surplus
 - Increase in producer surplus
 - Increase in government revenue
 - Net loss in domestic social welfare



Effect of a Tariff

At a world $P = \$0.10$ per pound, US consumers demand 70 mill. pounds of sugar per month, and US producers supply 20 mill. pounds per month; the difference is imported.

Tariff = $\$0.05$ per pound; $P = \$0.15$ per pound. US producers increase production to 30 mill. pounds; US consumers cut back to 60 mill. pounds. Imports fall to 30 mill. pounds.

a = increase in producer surplus


c = government revenue from the tariff

b = higher marginal cost of domestically producing sugar that could have been produced more cheaply abroad.

d = loss of consumer surplus from the drop in consumption

Consumers are worse off. Loss of consumer surplus: areas a , b , c , and d .



$b + d$ = Net welfare loss to the US economy



- **Import quotas**
 - **Legal limit on the amount of a commodity that can be imported**
 - **Target imports from certain countries**
 - **Effects**
 - **Raise the U.S. price above the world price**
 - **Reduce quantity below the free-trade level**
 - **Lower consumer surplus**
 - **Increase in producer surplus**
 - **Net loss in domestic social welfare**

Exhibit 8


Effect of a Quota



Quota=30 mill., world price=\$0.10. S' =supply curve (imports and US production; new price \$0.15: intersection of D and S').

Loss of consumer surplus: $a+b+c+d$; a = transfer from US consumers to US producers; $b+d$ = net loss; c = gain for sellers of foreign-grown sugar

- **Quotas in practice**
 - **Rewards domestic and foreign producers with higher prices**
 - **Lobbyists for foreign producers**
 - **Right to export to U.S.**
 - **Auction off the quotas**
 - **Increase federal revenue**
 - **Reduce pressure to perpetuate quotas**



- **Comparison: Tariffs and Quotas**
 - **Similarities**
 - Higher price
 - Lower quantity demanded
 - Loss of consumer surplus (U.S. Consumers)
 - Gain of producer surplus (U.S. producers)
 - Lower economic welfare
 - **Differences**
 - Revenue from tariff – U.S. government
 - Revenue from quota – to quota rights' owner

- **Export subsidies**
- **Domestic content requirements**
- **Other requirements**
 - **Health**
 - **Safety**
 - **Technical standards**
- **Bilateral agreements**
- **Trade restrictions**
 - **Slow economic progress**



Multilateral Agreement

- **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade**
 - **GATT:**
 - Reduce tariffs
 - Reduce import quotas
 - Equal trade
 - **1986, “Uruguay Round”**
 - 140 countries
 - Successor: WTO



The World Trade Organization

- Legal and institutional foundation for world trade
- 500 economists and lawyers
- Trade
 - Merchandise
 - Services
 - Intellectual property
- Phase out quotas
- Keep only tariffs



LO⁴

Doha Round and Round

- ◆ 1999, WTO, Seattle
- ◆ 50,000 protesters
- ◆ Largest demonstration against free trade
 - ◆ Labor union;
 - ◆ Environmental;
 - ◆ Farmers
- ◆ Labor and environmental standards
- ◆ Failed to get off the ground




Doha Round and Round

- ◆ 2001, Doha, Qatar “Doha Round”
 - ◆ Improve market access
 - ◆ Phase out export subsidies
 - ◆ Reduce subsidies in agriculture
- ◆ 2003, Cancun
- ◆ 2005, Hong Kong
- ◆ 2007, Germany
- ◆ Round and round



Common Markets

- **U.S. economy**
 - **Free trade zone across 50 states**
- **European Union**
 - **27 countries in 2007**
 - **Barrier-free European market**
 - **16 members: common currency – Euro**
- **North American Free Trade Agreement**
 - **United States, Canada, Mexico**




Common Markets

- **DR-CAFTA**
 - **U.S., Dominican Republic, five Central American countries**
- **Mercosur**
 - **Latin American countries**
- **ASEAN**
 - **Southeast Asian nations**
- **Southern African Customs Union**



Arguments for Trade Restrictions

- **National defense argument**
 - **More efficient**
 - **Government subsidies**
 - **Stockpile**
- **Infant industry argument**
 - **Foster inefficiencies**
 - **More efficient**
 - **Temporary production subsidies**



Arguments for Trade Restrictions

- **Antidumping argument**
 - **Dumping**
 - **Sell a product abroad for less than in the home market**
 - **Persistent**
 - **Consumers – pay less**
 - **Increase consumer surplus**
 - **Predatory**
 - **Temporary; eliminate competitors**
 - **Sporadic**
 - **“sales”**

Arguments for Trade Restrictions

- **Jobs and income**
 - Protect domestic jobs
 - Retaliation
 - Great Depression: high tariffs choked trade and jobs
- **Declining industries argument**
 - Help lessen shocks to the economy
 - Specific duration



Problems with Trade Protection

- **Protect one stage of production**
 - **Protect downstream stages**
- **Cost of protection**
 - **Welfare loss**
 - **Cost of rent seeking**
- **Transaction cost of enforcing restrictions**
 - **Black markets**
- **Less efficient, less innovative**
- **Retaliation**

Steel Tariffs

Case Study

- ◆ U.S. steel industry
 - ◆ Slow to adopt new technologies
 - ◆ Long and painful decline
- ◆ 2002: tariffs on imported steel
 - ◆ Helped U.S. steel industries
 - ◆ Cut imports; Boosted U.S. price of steel
 - ◆ Hurt U.S. steel-using industries
 - ◆ Less competitive
 - ◆ Cost: 15,000 to 20,000 jobs



Steel Tariffs

- ◆ **Expected retaliation**
 - ◆ **European Union**
 - ◆ **Threat to impose tariffs on U.S. exports**
 - ◆ **WTO**
 - ◆ **The tariffs = violation of trade agreements**
 - ◆ **Japan, South Korea**
 - ◆ **Threat to impose tariffs on U.S. exports**
- ◆ **December 2003**
 - ◆ **U.S. repealed the steel tariffs**